2017 Annual Meeting of Shareholders



The Amalgamated Bank’s LongView MidCap 400 Index Fund, 275 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10001, who has indicated it is a beneficial owner of more than $2,000 worth of the Company’s common stock, advised the Company that the following shareholder proposal will be presented at the annual meeting.

In accordance with the proxy regulations, the shareholder proposal and supporting statement presented below appear exactly as submitted. The Company disclaims all responsibility for the content of the proposal and the supporting statement, including sources referenced in the supporting statement.

For the reasons set forth in The Board’s Statement in Opposition, which immediately follows the proposal, our Board of Directors unanimously recommends that shareholders vote AGAINST this proposal.

Resolution Proposed by Shareholder

RESOLVED: The shareholders request that the Service Corporation International board of Directors take the steps necessary within the board's power to eliminate provisions in the Company's governing documents that require shareholders to approve a proposal by more than a majority of the shares voted, and to replace such provisions with a requirement of shareholder approval by a majority of the shares voted for and against applicable proposals, or a simple majority in compliance with applicable laws. If necessary, this means the closest standard to a majority of the votes cast for and against such proposals consistent with applicable laws.


In 2014 shareholders approved a non-binding shareholder proposal asking the board to "declassify" the board of Directors so that all Directors would be elected annually, rather than having one-third of the board elected each year to three-year terms. The proposal was adopted with 79.9% of the shares voted voting "yes."

In 2015 the board placed a binding declassification proposal before shareholders. That proposal was supported by 98.67% of the shares voting "yes" or "no," but the measure was defeated because it received 79.97% of the outstanding shares, falling just short of the requirement of approval from 80% of the outstanding shares.

The board did not re-submit a similar proposal to shareholders in 2016.

We are filing this proposal because we still believe in the importance of enhancing board accountability by requiring that all directors be elected annually. More broadly, we believe that the time has come to eliminate supermajority provisions generally in the Company's articles of incorporation, as those provisions can frustrate the views of an overwhelming majority of the Company's owners.

The 80% threshold applies not simply to board declassification, but also to approval of merger or consolidation agreements with a holder of over ten percent of the Company's stock; the size of the board; a shareholder vote to remove a director (though only a majority is required if 80% of the board votes for removal); the repeal or amendment of any of these provisions; and changes to the majority vote needed to amend or repeal the bylaws.

Supermajority voting requirements have been identified as one of six entrenching mechanisms that are negatively related to company performance, according to What Matters in Corporate Governance by Lucien Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell of the Harvard Law School. Supermajority requirements can be used to block initiatives supported by most shareowners, but opposed by a status quo management.

We are disappointed that the board did not renew its effort to establish annual director elections last year. Given the closeness of the vote in 2015, it would not seem difficult to have garnered the votes needed through additional efforts by a proxy solicitor and management. As the board chose not to do so, we believe that it is important to remedy the cause of this failure at its root.

We urge you to vote FOR this proposal.

The Board’s Statement in Opposition

The Board has carefully considered the above proposal, and believes that it is not in the interest of the shareholders. Accordingly, our Board recommends that you vote AGAINST the proposal.

Supermajority voting provisions provide protection against certain takeovers.

The supermajority voting provisions protect the Company’s shareholders by encouraging 10% beneficial owners making unsolicited takeover bids to negotiate directly with the Board. The board is subject to fiduciary duties under the law to act in a manner that it believes to be in the interests of the Company and its shareholders. In addition, more than 70% of the Company’s Board members are ‘independent’ under the standards adopted by the New York Stock Exchange. Supermajority voting requirements encourage potential acquirers to deal directly with the Board. The Company believes that its independent Board is in the best position to evaluate proposed offers, to consider alternatives, and to protect shareholders against abusive tactics during a takeover process, and as appropriate, to negotiate the best possible return for all shareholders. Elimination of these supermajority provisions would make it more difficult for the Company’s independent, shareholder-elected Board to preserve and maximize value for all shareholders in the event of an unsolicited takeover bid.

Supermajority voting provisions enhance the Board’s ability to carry out its fiduciary duties to act in the interests of all shareholders.

The Board has a fiduciary duty under the law to act in a manner that it believes to be in the interests of the Company and its shareholders. Shareholders, on the other hand, do not have the same fiduciary duty as the directors. As a result, a group of shareholders with a short-term focus may act in their own self-interests to the detriment of other shareholders. Accordingly, the supermajority voting standards are necessary to safeguard the long-term interests of the Company and its shareholders.

Supermajority voting provisions ensure that there is a broad consensus of support before a fundamental change is adopted.

Texas law permits supermajority voting requirements and a number of publicly-traded companies have adopted these provisions to preserve and maximize long-term value for all shareholders. Because these provisions give holders of less than a majority of the outstanding shares the ability to defeat certain extraordinary transactions or fundamental changes, they generally have the effect of giving minority shareholders a greater voice in corporate structure and governance. The Board strongly believes that extraordinary transactions and fundamental changes to corporate governance should have the support of a broad consensus of the Company’s shareholders rather than a simple majority. Our governing documents were intentionally created to include a supermajority vote standard that would apply to certain specific and limited areas because of their importance to the Company. The Board also believes that the supermajority vote requirements protect shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, against the potentially self-interested actions of short-term investors. Without these provisions, it would be possible for a group of shortterm shareholders to approve an extraordinary transaction that is not in the best interest of the Company and opposed by nearly half of the Company’s shareholders.

Summary of supermajority voting provisions.

Under the Company’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws (collectively, governance documents), a simple majority vote requirement already applies to most matters submitted for shareholder approval. Our governance documents require the affirmative vote of not less than four-fifths of the outstanding shares of common stock entitled to vote for a few, but important, matters of corporate structure and governance. Those are as follows: (i) an alteration, amendment or repeal, or any new provision, inconsistent with certain provisions of the existing governance documents; (ii) the amendment of governance documents regarding the size or declassification of the Board; (iii) the merger, consolidation, sale or certain other transactions of the Company with a beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of capital stock of the Company; or (iv) the removal of directors by shareholders, except that a majority vote will suffice for removal of a director if four-fifths of the Board recommends such removal. The Board believes that in these limited circumstances the higher voting requirements are appropriate and enable the shareholderelected Board members to most effectively safeguard the long-term interests of all of the shareholders.

In 2015, the Board of Directors provided and recommended to shareholders a declassification proposal to phase out the classified structure of our Board of Directors so that all directors would be elected annually. However, the declassification proposal was not approved by the requisite affirmative vote of at least four-fifths of the outstanding shares of common stock of the Company. In conjunction with the current proposal, the Board of Directors has again reviewed considerations relating to declassification, including that a classified board provides stability and continuity, protects shareholder value and furthers director independence. While the Board believes there are certain merits to declassification, the Board believes that elimination of all existing supermajority voting standards is not in the interests of all shareholders as discussed above.

Important Note

It is important to note that shareholder approval of this non-binding proposal would not itself result in the adoption of simple majority voting. Under the Company’s governance documents, to change the supermajority voting requirements, the Board must first authorize amendments to the Company’s governance documents, which amendments then must be approved by the holders of at least 80% of all classes of outstanding stock of the Company entitled to vote.

After careful consideration of this proposal, the Board determined that retention of the supermajority voting requirements remain in the long-term interests of the Company and its shareholders. The Board believes that the substantial benefits of a supermajority voting requirement do not come at the expense of prudent corporate governance. To the contrary, the voting requirement is designed to protect the interests of all shareholders.

The Board of Directors recommends a vote "AGAINST" the proposal.